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The First Scottsboro Trials:
A Legal Lynching
Faust Rossi
Editor’s Note: This account of the Scottsboro case, ap-
pearing in two parts and concluding in the spring issue
of the Cornell Law Forum, was derived from a summer
2001 Cornell Adult University class on great American
trials that the author co-taught with Glenn C. Altschuler,
the Thomas and Dorothy Litwin Professor of American
Studies at Cornell.1
“No crime in American history – let alone a crime
that never occurred—produced as many trials,
convictions, reversals, and retrials as did the alleged
gang rape of two white girls by nine black teenagers
on the Southern Railroad freight run from Chatta-
nooga to Memphis on March 25, 1931. Over the
course of the next two decades, the
struggle for justice of the ‘Scottsboro
Boys,’ as the black teens were called,
made celebrities out of anonymous
people, launched and ended careers,
wasted lives and produced heroes,
opened southern juries to blacks, exac-
erbated sectional strife and divided
America’s political left.”2
In the course of their struggle against prejudice
and an unresponsive court system, the Scottsboro
Boys, together or separately, endured 16 trials, two
United States Court reversals, as many as four
series of death sentences, and prison terms ranging
from 6 to nearly 17 years. Although the State of
Alabama, try as it might, was unable to execute the
Scottsboro youths, their lives were left in shambles.
The Setting
The setting for this saga is Alabama in 1931. To
understand what happened, we need to be re-
minded of the contextual background, and particu-
larly of three major aspects of life in the Deep
South.
First, during the Depression, economic hard
times were prevalent everywhere but were particu-
larly bad in Tennessee, Alabama, and many of the
southern rural areas. There was a substantial
underclass of unemployed persons, whites and
blacks both, who often lived together in so-called
hobo jungles or shacks in sections of larger south-
ern cities. In this surprisingly integrated society the
common elements were poverty and joblessness.
Women mill workers who became unemployed
Above: Fearing a mob lynching, Alabama Governor
B. M. Miller called in the National Guard to protect
the accused: Clarence Norris, Olen Montgomery,
Andy Wright, Willie Roberson, Ozzie Powell, Eugene
Williams, Charlie Weems, Roy Wright, and Haywood
Patterson
The Scottsboro Boys endured 16 trials, two United States
Court reversals, as many as four series of death sentences,
and prison terms ranging from 6 to nearly 17 years.
2 Cornell Law Forum
often resorted to prostitution in order to earn
enough to survive. The two white women, the
alleged rape victims, came from this milieu. In the
constant search for jobs, a preferred method of
transportation was to hop a freight train. Hoboing,
“riding the rails,” was a way of life for many.
Second, there was the extreme racism that pre-
vailed in southern society—a ruthless oppression of
black people. Most white citizens of the south were
not cruel in their daily lives but they
expected blacks to keep their place.
They believed that black people were
inferior. There was often a suspicion
that young black males, if not con-
trolled, would always be prone to rape a
white woman. Even a well-educated,
moderate Southerner of this period who would
oppose lynchings and violence would doubtlessly
support segregation, and would see nothing wrong
in the fact that blacks could not vote or serve on
juries. Such a person would certainly resent north-
ern troublemakers who would try to meddle by
criticizing southern customs.
Third, on a national level, the law was largely
unresponsive to the plight of black people. In
1868, the Federal Constitution was amended to
provide that no state shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor deny to any person the equal protection
of the laws. These Constitutional guarantees, ar-
ticulated in the 14th Amendment, meant that the
national government pledged to enforce legal
equality between blacks and whites. After Recon-
struction, however, the federal government and the
courts—including the United States Supreme
Court—failed to breathe life into these legal rules.
The words were there, the promise was there, but
the reality was ignored. Yes, black people were
now entitled to vote, but somehow they didn’t.
Yes, black people were now entitled to sit on
juries, but somehow they didn’t. In the absence
of specific evidence of actual state discrimination,
little was done. And specific evidence usually
meant an admission by state officials that they
were intentionally discriminating. Our nation
declined to enforce the 14th Amendment on behalf
of black people. There was a reluctance in the
federal government to meddle with state proce-
dures when it came to civil rights issues. It re-
flected the tendency of the rest of the nation to let
Southerners handle the race question as they
pleased.3
In addition, another aspect of the law was un-
developed. The protections afforded to criminal
defendants, white or black, were not clearly de-
fined. The 14th Amendment imposes limitations
on the states but these limitations are phrased in
the somewhat vague and general words “due pro-
cess” and “equal protection.” On the other hand,
The protections afforded to criminal defendants, white or
black, were not clearly defined.
The Scottsboro defendants leaving jail in Decatur,
Alabama
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the Bill of Rights—the first 10
amendments, enacted in 1791 when
our Constitution was originally
adopted—are more specific. The Sixth
Amendment, for example, speaks of the
right to the assistance of counsel in a
criminal case, the right to confront witnesses, and
the right to trial by jury. But the Bill of Rights was
framed to limit federal power, not state power.
Thus, the question was whether these specific pro-
tections, like the right to counsel and the right to a
jury trial, were included in the 14th Amendment
phrase, “due process,” or in the meaning of “equal
protection.” In 1931, the answer was not clear. In
many instances, the United States Supreme Court
had not yet decided which portions of the specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights were incorporated
into 14th Amendment due process. It was unclear,
in other words, which of the specific limitations on
the federal government and on federal courts were
also limitations on state governments and on state
courts.4
The Tragedy Begins
The Scottsboro tragedy began on March 25, 1931.
A Southern Railroad freight train left Chattanooga,
Tennessee, on its way to Memphis. Scattered
among the cars were some two dozen people—
some white, some black. The train followed the
course of the Tennessee River. It traveled west,
then dipped south into rural northern Alabama,
where its path would take it through places like
Stevenson, Paint Rock, and Huntsville until it ran
north again to Memphis.
Shortly after the slow-moving train crossed the
Alabama border, a white youth walked across the
top of a railroad car and stepped on the hand of an
18-year-old black man named Haywood Patterson.
A fight broke out between the whites and blacks.
The larger group of blacks got the better of it and
forced all the whites except one off the train. The
whites who were ejected from the train complained
at a nearby depot that they had been assaulted by a
gang of blacks. The stationmaster telegraphed
ahead to the Paint Rock station. Word reached the
county sheriff, who deputized every man in Paint
Rock who had a gun and lined them up along the
tracks at the depot. This posse was ordered to arrest
every black person on the train when it stopped at
Paint Rock.
The train arrived and was searched. The posse
found nine black males ranging in age from 12 to
20 years old. Only four of the nine had known
each other before they were arrested. Then came a
surprise. Two young white women, with men’s
caps on their heads and dressed in men’s overalls,
were also found on the train. They were unem-
ployed mill workers named Victoria Price and
Ruby Bates. They had gone to Chattanooga, they
said, in search of work; having found none, they
were now returning home to Huntsville.
As the deputies were tying the blacks together,
one of the girls told a deputy that she and the other
woman had been raped by the nine of them. Every-
one was transported to Scottsboro, the county seat.
In the jail, the older of the two girls, Victoria Price,
identified six of the nine blacks as her assailants.
The guard concluded that “if those six had Miss
Price, it stands to reason the others had Miss
Bates.” One of the accused, Clarence Norris, pro-
tested and called Vickie Price a liar. The guard hit
him with a rifle butt. The women were promptly
sent downtown to be examined by two local physi-
cians.
Farmers from the nearby hills began gathering.
By dusk, a crowd of several hundred had as-
sembled. They surrounded the dilapidated two-
story jail. There were shouts of “Give them to us,”
and “If you don’t, we’ll come in and get them!”
The sheriff called the governor in Montgomery and
the governor ordered the National Guard to
Scottsboro. There would be no lynching tonight.
The idea that a capital case could be tried less than two
weeks after the crime seems incredible even by the
prevailing standards of 1931.
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The First Trials
Now events moved rapidly. Under the
threat of mob violence, with the Na-
tional Guard’s constant presence and
manned machine guns on the court-
house steps deterring hostile crowds of
thousands, the nine blacks were hustled to trial just
12 days after their arrest. The idea that a capital
case could be tried less than two weeks after the
crime seems incredible even by the prevailing stan-
dards of 1931.
Of the nine defendants, one was 12 years old
and away from home for the first time. Another
was 13. A third was practically blind. Another was
suffering from a venereal disease so acute that any
act of intercourse would have been extremely pain-
ful; to walk, this man needed a cane. All the blacks
were illiterate, far from their homes, and without
access to their families. They were not asked
whether they had or could get a lawyer. They were
not asked whether they had relatives who could be
called and who might be able to hire a lawyer for
them. They were not told that a lawyer could be
appointed to defend them.
Just before the proceedings began, the judge
asked simply if the case was ready for trial. Yes,
said the prosecutor. No one answered for the de-
fendants. A Tennessee real estate lawyer, not a
member of the Alabama bar and unfamiliar with
Alabama law, stood up and said he was not repre-
senting the defendants but was willing to advise
them. An elderly local lawyer who had not tried a
case in many years agreed to advise the Tennessee
lawyer. It was never clear whether either of these
“advisors,” or anyone else, represented the accused.
The Tennessee lawyer did participate on behalf of
the Scottsboro defendants—in a manner of speak-
ing. He was allowed 25 minutes to confer with his
clients. No time was provided for a reasonable
investigation of the alleged crime or of the back-
grounds of the alleged victims. There was no time
to find witnesses. So the trials began.
The defendants were tried in four groups.
Clarence Norris and Charlie Weems were tried
first, because they were the oldest. Next came
Haywood Patterson, the one whose hand had been
stepped on. The third trial involved a group of five
defendants: Ozzie Powell, Willie Roberson, Andy
Wright, Eugene Williams, and Olen Montgomery.
The fourth and final trial was that of Roy Wright,
the 12-year-old.
Before each of the four juries, the key prosecu-
tion testimony was that of the alleged victims,
Victoria Price and Ruby Bates, and the local doc-
tors, Bridges and Lynch. Both doctors testified to
having found semen in the vaginas of the two
Haywood Patterson
The prosecutor did not ask for the death penalty—only life
imprisonment. That act of mercy disappointed the jury, a
majority of which held out for the death penalty.
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women. The adviser, or “lawyer,” for the accused
did not question the medical testimony, did not
make much of an opening statement, and, incred-
ibly, saw no purpose in giving a summation. Worse
still, because the adviser did not have the opportu-
nity to speak to his clients at length, he could not
prepare them to testify. He called them to the
stand nonetheless, so they could say whatever they
wanted. As you might expect, some of the nine
said, in effect, “Not me and not my two or three
friends, but, yes, these other defendants, they are
the ones who did it.” No single lawyer can repre-
sent multiple clients if the latter blame each other
for the crime charged. It would constitute a gross
conflict of interest. But these “technicalities” went
unnoticed or were ignored. In short, the defense,
insofar as it existed at all, was a disaster.
These rapid-fire trials were over in three days.
Most took five hours or less. The jury
deliberations for most of the trials
averaged about 30 minutes. The ver-
dict for eight of the nine was “guilty of
rape” and the penalty in each case was
death. The exception was the trial of
Roy Wright, the 12-year-old. Here the
jury could not agree and the result was
a hung jury. Why couldn’t the jury agree? Well,
because Mr. Wright was only 12, the prosecutor
did not ask for the death penalty—only life impris-
onment. That act of mercy disappointed the jury, a
majority of which held out for the death penalty.
As a result, they could not render the required
unanimous verdict.
From the time of arrest to the time of the death
sentences only two weeks had passed.
Saviors
The Scottsboro Boys did not die in the electric
chair. Not then, and not later. Who saved them? In
this tragedy there were heroes—individuals or
groups whose skill or courage or commitment
saved the lives of these young victims.
In chronological order of appearance, the first of
these saviors was the American Communist Party
(ACP). The initial media response to the convic-
tions was limited to a few brief stories in several
newspapers. There was no national media presence
at the trial. Soon after the convictions, the ACP
became involved. They knew a good issue when
they saw it. The convictions, the ACP argued, were
a dramatic example of capitalistic repression of the
poor. Obviously, their motive in helping the
Scottsboro Boys was propaganda. But were their
motives important? When you are powerless and
facing death, when no one else is aiding your cause,
you take what help you can get. The ACP had the
means and the network to mobilize mass protests
that brought the case national and international
attention. Within days, demonstrations throughout
the United States, as well as in Germany, Spain,
and Moscow, raised a storm of protest. Moreover,
the communists had a well-established legal defense
team; the International Labor Defense and its chief
lawyer, Joseph Brodsky, were experienced and
dedicated. The Scottsboro Boys now had support
and competent legal representation.
The next savior to enter the picture was the
United States Supreme Court. After the convic-
tions were affirmed in the Alabama courts, they
were appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
In the landmark decision of Powell v. Alabama,5 the
Court reversed the Scottsboro convictions. This
decision appears in all the constitutional law and
criminal procedure casebooks. Let me explain why.
There was no question that the Justices regarded
the legal representation of the Scottsboro Boys
inadequate. It was never clear whether the Tennes-
The convictions, the American Communist Party argued,
were a dramatic example of capitalistic repression
of the poor.
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see lawyer was really representing the defendants.
He seemed tentative, probably because of the mob
atmosphere. He had no time to prepare. Counsel
was never formerly appointed by the court. The
unfairness was obvious. But the Supreme Court
needed a legal basis on which to reverse. The spe-
cific Sixth Amendment right to counsel would do
nicely except, as I’ve mentioned, the Sixth Amend-
ment operated only against the federal government,
not against the states. The 14th Amendment’s “due
process” clause does apply to the states but what
does “due process” entail? There was no precedent
that said the right to counsel applies to the states
through the operation of 14th Amendment due
process—no precedent, that is, until Powell v.
Alabama created it in 1932.
This decision is a legal landmark because it
extended and clarified the meaning of due process.
It is a seminal right-to-counsel decision—seminal
because it is the basis of the decisions that followed.
In Powell, the Court said two things. First, it read
the right to counsel into the due process clause.
Therefore, this guarantee would now apply to all
state trials. Second, it applied that principle to the
Scottsboro trial and found that due process was
lacking. That insufficiency saved the Scottsboro
Boys from being executed—at least for now.
To understand the long-term significance of this
decision, we have to appreciate that the actual
holding was a narrow one. What the Court said
was that 14th Amendment due process requires the
effective right to counsel in this case because in this
case the defendants were all young, uneducated,
and illiterate. A mob atmosphere surrounded the
trial and this was a capital case. The Court left
open a host of questions that would be answered
later. Does the right to counsel apply to all capital
cases—even if the defendants are mature and edu-
cated, and there are no mobs? Yes, said the Court
in a later decision. Does the right to counsel apply
to non-capital, serious felony cases? Yes, said the
Court some years later. Does the right to counsel
apply to all felonies, whether serious or not? Yes,
said the Court in another decision. When in the
trial process does the right to counsel attach—only
at the time of trial? No—earlier; at least at the
time of indictment, answered the Court. Why not
even earlier than that, such as at the time of initial
arraignment? Good point, said the Court, and it so
held. Why not still earlier? The Court ultimately
agreed, and held that the right to counsel attaches
at the time of custodial interrogation. If the police
arrest a suspect and the suspect asks for a lawyer, at
that point all interrogation of the suspect must
stop. But how will the suspect know he has this
right to counsel? Ultimately, the Court held in
Miranda v. Arizona6 that if the police take a sus-
pect into custody, they must advise him that he
has the right to a lawyer and that if he cannot
afford one, a lawyer will be appointed for him.
Thus, over the course of 35 years, in decision after
decision, the Supreme Court expanded the right to
counsel in state as well as federal trials. Where did
all this begin? It began with Powell v. Alabama.
This is not the end of the story. Now the nine
Scottsboro defendants must return to the Alabama
courts to be tried again. And back in Alabama, not
much has changed.
To be continued
1. This description of the Scottsboro case draws heavily
from court transcripts, newspaper articles, court opinions,
and secondary sources, including in particular materials
accessible at the impressive website of Professor Douglas
Linder, on “Famous American Trials,” at www.law.umkc
.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scottsboro/scottsb.htm;
and contained in the acclaimed book, Scottsboro: “A Trag-
edy of the American South” (LSU Press 1969, 1979) by
historian Dan T. Carter. Also helpful in telling the story
were documentaries by the Public Broadcasting System and
Courtroom Television Network now available on video-
tape.
2. Linder, supra, note 1.
3. Carter, supra, note 1 at 321-324.
4. Carter, supra, note 1 at 161-164.
5. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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